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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the problem of probabilistic reasoning as 
it applies to Truth Maintenance Systems. A Belief Maintenance 
System hal! been constructed which manages a current set of 
probabilistic beliefs in much the same way that a TMS manages 
a set of true/false beliefs. Such a system may be thought of as 
a generalization of a. Truth Maintenance System. It enables one 
to reason using normal two or three-valued logic or using 
probabilistic values to represent partial belief. The design of 
the Belief Maintenance System is described and some problems 
are discussed which require further research. Finally, some 
examples are presented which show the utility of such a system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Truth Maintenance Systems have been used extensively 
in problem solving tasks to help organize a set of facts and 
detect inconsistencies in the believed state of the world. These 
systems maintain a set of true/false propositions and their 
associated dependencies. In trying to reason about real world 
problems, however, situations often arise in which we are 
unsure of certain facts or in which the conclusions WI! can draw 
from avail able information are somewhat uncertain. The non­
monotonic TMS (Doyle, 1979) was an attempt at reasoning 
when we don't know all the facts. Non-monotonic systems, 
however, fail to take into account degrees of belief and how 
available evidence can combine to strengthen a particular belief. 
This paper addresses the problem of probabilistic 
reasoning as it applies to Truth Maintenance Systems. It 
describes a Belief Ma.intenance St�slem that manages a current 
set of beliefs in much the same way that a TMS manages a 
current set of true/false propositions. If the system knows that 
belief in fact1 is dependent in some way upon belief in fact2, then 
it automatically modifies belief in fact1 if we give it some new 
information which causes a change in belief of fact2• It models 
the behavior of a normal TMS, replacing its 3-valued logic 
(true, false, unknown) with an infinite-valued logic, in such a 
way as to reduce to a standard TMS if all statements are given 
in absolute true/false terms. Belief Maintenance Systems can, 
therefore, be thought of as a generalization of Truth 
Maintenance Systems, whose possible reasoning tasks are a 
superset of those for a TMS. 
2. DESIGN 
The design of the belief maintenance system is based on 
current TMS technology, specifically a monotonic version of 
Doyle's justification-based TMS (1979). As in the TMS, a 
network is constructed which consists of nodes representing 
facts and justification links between nodes representing 
antecedent support of a set of nodes for some consequent node. 
The BMS differs in that nodes take on a measure of belief rather 
than true or false and justification links become supportlinkB in 
that they provide partial evidence in favor of a node. 
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The basic design consists of three parts: ( 1) the 
conceptual control structure, (2) the user hooks to the 
knowledge base, and (3) the belief formalism. A simple parser 
is use<i to translate user assertions (e.g. (implies (and a 
b) c)) into control primitives. This enables the basic design 
to be semi-independent of the belief system used. All that is 
required of the belief formalism is that it is invertiblt>. 
Specifically, if A provides support for B and our belief in A 
changes, we must be able to remove the effects the previous 
belief in A had on our belief in B. 
2.1. Overview of Dempster-Shafer Theory 
The particular belief system used here is based on the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Shafer, 1 976; Barnett, 
1981; Garvey et al, 1981). Shafer's representation expresses the 
belief in some proposition A by the interval [ s(A), p(A) I. where 
s(A) represents the current amount of support for A and p(A) is 
the plausibility of A. It is often best to think of p(A) in terms of 
the lack of evidence against A, for p(A) = 1 - s(-.A). To 
simplify calculations, the BMS represents Shafer intervals by 
the pair (s(A) s(-.A)) rather than the interval [s(A) p(A)[ 
(Ginsberg, 1984). 
Dempster's rule provides a means for combining 
probabilities baaed upon different sources of information. His 
'language of belief functions defines a jra.me of discernment, e' 
as the exhaustive set of possibilities or values in some domain. 
For example, if the domain represents the values achieved from 
rolling a die, e is the set of 6 propositions of the form "the die 
rolled a j." If m1 and m2 are two basic probability functions 
over the same space e, each representing a different knowledge 
source, then Dempster's orthogonal sum defines a new combined 
probability function m which is stated as m = m1 $ m2• 
Since the primary concern here is the use of probability 
theory in a deductive reasoning system, we are interested in the 
case where e contains only two values, A and -.A. For this 
case, the basic probability function has only three values, m(A), 
m(-.A), and m(8). This allows the derivation of a simplified 
versic·1 of Dempster's formula (Prade, 1983; Ginsberg, 1984): 
(a.b)$(c d) = rl- (ii'c 
b )  1- ad + c 1
- bd '] 
1 -(ad + be) . 
where ii' means (1 - a). It also allows us to formulate an inverse 
functi.n for subtracting evidence (Ginsberg, 1984): 
( a b) - ( e d) = ( c( ad - be) cd- bee -add d'(bc- ad) ] ed - bee- add 
The decision to choose Dempster-Shafer Theory ovt>r 
other systems of belief was purely pragmatic. Dempster-Shafer 
has been shown to be invertible, it distinguishes between 
absolutely unknown (no evidence) and uncertain, and H is 
simple to use. However, the design of the BMS is not based on 
a particular belief formalism and there sb,ould be little difficulty 
(as far as the BMS itself is concerned) in adapting it to use some 
other belief system. 
2.2. A Logie of Beliefs 
The conventional meaning of two-valued logic must be 
redefined in terms of evidence so that the system can interpret 
and maintain its set of beliefs baaed on the uaer-supplied 
axioms. 
NOT 
Because Dempster-Shafer theory allows us to expren 
belief for and belief against in a single probability interval, 
(not A) and A can s�mply be stored as the same proposition, 
A, where 
AND 
There are a number of approaches to the meaning of 
AND. The interpretation used here corresponds to that of 
{Garvey et al, 11181}: 
AI•A 1-.JJ 
BI'B o..,s) 
c,'C o..,cl 
The -2 term represents (1 - cardinality(conjuncts)). 
OR 
The belief in OR is the maximum of the individual 
beliefs (Garvey et al, 1981): 
IMPLIES 
A(oA •-,A) 
BI'B o_,sJ 
There are two theories in the literature for the 
interpretation of IMPLIES using Dempster-Shafer. (Dubois and 
Prade, 198&) suggests that, for A-+B, we take into account the 
value of Bel(B->A). Because the BMS should be simple to use 
and because Bel(B-+A) can be difficult to obtain, the use of 
IMPLIES will be the same as (Ginsberg, 1984; Dubois & Prade, 
1985): 
This adheres to the idea that if full belief in A implies B0•8, then 
a half belief in A should imply B0.4• 
With these operators defined, the system can parse all 
user assertions and construct the necessary support links with 
the appropriate belief functions attached to them. 
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2.3. Support Links 
A support link consists of a list of antecedent nodes, a 
consequent node, its current positive and negative support for 
its conaequent, and a function for recalculating its support 
baaed on the current belief of the antecedent• (when the support 
is provided by the user, forming a premire linlc, no such function 
exists). Figure 1 shows a sample support link network. The 
system recognises two types of support links - hD.rd linlct and 
invertible lin/cr. 
2.3.1. Hard Support Links 
A hard support link is one which provides an absolute 
statement of its consequent's belief. For example , statements of 
the form 
(implies x (andy z)) 
are translated into 
(implies x y) 
(implies x z) 
As a re�ult, node� are never allowed to give support directly to 
an "and" node and the only support enterhtg an "and" node 
must come from the individual conjuncts. A support link For an 
"and" node is therefore given the status "hard link" and the 
value of the consequent node equals the link's support. In 
Figure 1, if the belief in A changes, a new value is calculated for 
the conjunctive link using its attached formula for AND, and 
the node for (AND A B) is set to the new value. 
2.3.2. Invertible Support Links 
Links repre�enting implication or user support act as 
only one source of evidence for their consequent node. Such 
links are designated invertible since a change in their support 
means that their old support must be subtracted (using the 
inverted form of Dempster's rule) before the new value is added. 
In Figure 1, if the belief in D changes, then the current support 
provided by D's link into C is subtracted, the link support is 
recalculated, and the new support is added to C (using 
Dempster's rule). 
2.(. Control 
The basic control structure of the BMS is similar to that 
of a TMS. When the belief in a node ia modified, the affects of 
this new belief are propagated throughout the system. This is 
done by following the node's outgoing links and performing the 
appropriate operations for modifying hard and invertible links' 
support. Propagation of evidence may be defined so as to 
A 
(0.5. 0.0) 
B 
(0.7. 0.0) 
A&B (l.O . o.o).,.. c 
(0.2. 0.0) (0.15. 0.24) 
D �) 
(0.4 . 0.0) 
Figure 1. A Sample BMS Network 
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terminate early (Ginsberg, 1985a). If the change made to a 
node's belief state is sufficiently small, there is no need to 
propagate this change to every node dependent upon it. A 
threshold value, *propagation-delta*, is defined so that, when 
the change to a node's positive and negative beliefs are less than 
the threshold, the system will not continue to propagate 
changes past this node. The default threshold is 10-3• 
In a TMS architecture, only one justification is needed to 
establish truth. Any independent justifications are extraneous. 
Using a probabilistic architecture, each source of support adds 
to the node's overall belief. All incoming supports must be 
combined (using Dempster's rule) to form the overall belief for 
the node. If one tries to combine two contradicting, absolute 
beliefs, (1 0) e (0 1), the system would simply detect the 
attempt and signal a contradiction in the same way that a TMS 
would. Thresholds could also be used so that if a strongly 
positive belief is to be combined with a strongly negative belief, 
the system could signal a contradiction. Caution should be used 
for this case, however, because non-monotonic inferences should 
not be interpreted as contradictions. 
2.4.1. New Control Iasues 
Circular support structures like that of Figure 2 cause a 
number of problems for belief maintenance. Because of these 
problems, the current implementation requires that no such 
structures exist and it will signal an error if one is discovered. 
There are a variety of problems which the structure in Figure 2 
can cause: 
(1) lnterprettltion of circuJ4r evidence. When A is partially 
believed and the status of E is unknown, what can be said 
about the support which D provides to B! All of the 
evidence D ia supplying to B originally came from B in the 
first place. Because all links entering B will combine 
according to Dempster's rule to form a single belief, B may 
be believed more strongly than A simply because B supplies 
evidence in favor of D through C. This does not seem 
intuitively correct. 
(2) ProblemB with. poBBible cureB. There are several potential 
solutions to this problem. First, D could be allowed to 
provide· support for B. This situation is undefined under 
normal probability theory. Second, the chain can be stopped 
at D by not allowing any node to provide support to one of 
its supporters (by transitivity). This introduces a new 
problem. What should happen when E is providing 
independent support for D? Forcing the system to only 
propagate those supports for D which are independent of B 
would require a much more sophisticated control structure. 
Figure 2. Circular Support Structure 
(3) Retrtlction or modific41ion of rupport. Modifying support 
links becomes much more difficult if circular support 
structures are allowed to exist in the system. Any time the 
support A provides for B changes, the old support A 
provided must be retracted. This means removing all 
support from A, propagating the change in B, adding in the 
new support from A, and propagating the new belief in B. 
This will cause the belief in C to be propagated four times 
(twice when B changes the first time and twice when B 
changes the second time), the belief in D to be propagated 8 
times, etc. In addition, retracting the support A provides 
for B means that we must retract all support for B (to 
remove the effects D has on B), propagate the new lack of 
belief in B, and then recalculate a new belief for B based on 
the new value for A and the current values of its other 
support links. Doing this every time the belief for any node 
changes makes such a system untenable. When we assume 
there is no circular support in the network, modifying belief 
in A simply involves subtracting its old support for B, 
adding in its new support for B, and then propagating the 
new belief in B. 
The use of beliefs also causes problems for systems that 
explicitly calculate transitivity relations. Suppose we were to 
assert A - C based on the knowledge A - B and B - C. 
This action would cause the system's belief in C to increase, 
even though we were simply making explicit information which 
already existed. 
2.5. User Support 
The system has been designed so that it will appear to 
operate in exactly the same manner as the standard 
justification-based TMS. Thus, it is able to handle assertions 
using. the connectives AND, OR, NOT, and IMPLIES. If a 
contradiction occurs, the system will notify the user and seek to 
resolve the contradiction. In addition to the normal TMS 
operations, the BMS supports additional operations 
corresponding to its belief-oriented knowledge. 
2.5.1. Queries 
In the TMS, queries are of the form (true? sttltement) . 
Since truth is measured here in terms of belief, the query 
language can be extended. Truth is redefined in terms of a 
threshold, so that a belief over a certain threshold is considered 
to be true. 
true? 
falser 
unknownr 
absolutely-true? 
absolutely-false? 
absolutely-unknown r 
support-for 
support-against 
possible-true 
possible-false 
belief-uncertainty 
= belief+(node) > *belief-threshold* 
= belief-(node) > *belief-threshold• 
= belief+(node) < *belief-threshold* 
and belief-(node) < *belief-threshold* 
= belief+(node) = 1.0 
= belief-(node) = 1.0 
= belief+(node) = 0.0 
and belief-(node) = 0.0 
= belief+(node) 
= belief-( node) 
= 1 - belief+(node) 
= 1 - belief-(node) 
= 1 - belief-(node) - belief+(node) 
2.5.2. Frames of Discernment 
In addition to the default usage of the simplified version 
of Dempster's rule, where each node is treated as a frame of 
discernment, 8, containing {A, -,A), the user may define a 
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specific frame of discernment by the function call: _ 
(frame-of-discernment node1 node2 ... noden) 
This establishes a frame-of-discernment stating that the given 
nodes represent an exhaustive set of possibilities or values in 
some domain. Evidence in favor of one node acts to discredit 
belief in the other members of the set. Evidence may be 
provided to support any of the nodes from outside the set, but 
no support link is allowed to change once it has a non-zero 
value. This is due to the (current) uninvertibility of the general 
form of Dempster's rule. When new evidence is provided for 
one of the nodes in the set, the belief in all the nodes is 
recalculated according to Dempster's orthogonal sum so that 
the sum of the beliefs for the nodes in the set is less-than or 
equal-to one. The affect of these changes are then propagated 
to any support these nodes provide to the rest of the system. 
2.6. Rule Engine 
Because the BMS does not allow variables to exist in the 
knowledge base, pattern-directed rules are required to provide 
demons which trigger on certain events in the knowledge base 
(McAIIester, 1980; Charniak et al, 1980). The rules are of the 
form: 
(rule (nested-triggers) body) 
For example, the rule 
(rule ( (:INTERN (dog ?x))) 
(assert (implies (dog ?x} (mammal ?x)))) 
causes the implication (implies (dog fido) (mammal 
fido)) to be asserted when (dog fido) first appears in the 
knowledge base {whether it is believed or not). 
The rule 
(rule ((-BELIEF+ (foo ?x) 0 8 test (numberp ?x)) 
( BELIEF- (bar ?y) 0 9)) 
(print "Support for Foo is now > 0 .8") 
(pr1nt "Support against Bar is now > 0.9")) 
fires when the belief in some (foo ?x), where ?xis a number, 
exceeds 0.8 and the belief in some (not (bar ?y)) exceeds 
0. 9. There are three types of rule triggers. The : INTERN 
trigger causes the rule to fire each time a new fact is added to 
the knowledge base which matches the given pattern. The 
BELIEF+ trigger causes the rule to fire each time the support 
in favor of an instance of its pattern first exceeds the specified 
value. A BELIEF- rule fires when the support against its 
pattern exceeds the specified value. 
3. EXAMPLES 
There are a number of possible uses for a belief 
maintenance system. It enables us to perform normal TMS, 
three-valued, deductive logic operations. For example, we can 
make assertions such as 
(assert (implies a b)) 
(assert (implies b c)) 
(assert a) 
and the system will automatically propagate the fact that b 
and C are true. If we then stated that C was false, the system 
would signal a contradiction and indicate that the contradiction 
results from the two user premises a and (not c). 
The BMS is also able to reason with probabilistic or 
uncertain information. It is able to state the current partial 
belief in a particular item and the sources of this belief. In 
addition, a belief maintenance system is able to handle non­
monotonic reasoning much more elegantly than a two or three 
valued logic is able to (Ginsberg, 1984, 1985b ). Consider the 
classic non-monotonic problem about birds "in general" being 
able to fly. If one were to replace a rule about birds using 
Doyle's (1979) consistency operator with a probabilistic one 
atating that roughly 90 to 95'11i of all birds fly 
(bird 1x) -+ (fly ?x)(O.IO O.O&) 
the desired non-monotonic behavior comes automatically from 
negative rules such as 
(ostrich ?x) --. (fly ?x)10 I) 
No modifications of the control structure are needed to perform 
non-monotonic reasoning. 
3.1. Rule-based Pattern Matching 
The belief maintenance &ystem has been u&ed to 
implelllent a rule-based, probabilistic pattern matching 
algorithm which is able to form the type of matching typical in 
analogies in a manner consistent with Gentner's Structure­
Mapping Theory of analogy (Gentner, 1983; Falkenhainer, 
Forbus, & Gentner, 1986). For example, suppose we tried to 
match 
(AND (CAUSE (> (PRESSURE beaker) (PRESSURE vial)) 
(a) (FLOW beaker vial water pipe)) 
(> (DIAMETER beaker) (DIAMETER vial))) 
with 
(b) 
(AND (> (TEMP coffee) (TEMP ice-cube)) 
(FLOW coffee ice-cube heat bar)) 
A standard unifier would not be able to form the 
correspondences necessary for those two forms to match. First, 
the forms are different in their overall structure. Second, the 
arguments of similar substructures differ, as in (FLOW beaker 
Vlal water pipe) and (FLOW coffee ice-cube heat bar). 
The rule-based pattern matcher, however, is able to find all 
consistent matches between form (a) and form (b). These 
matches correspond to the possible interpretations of the 
potential analogy between (a) and (b). They are 
(1) 
(2) 
(> (PRESSURE beaker) (PRESSURE vial)) 
++ (> (TEMP coffee) (TEMP ice-cube)) 
(FLOW beaker vial water pipe) 
++ (FLOW coffee lee-cube heat bar) 
(> (DIAMETER beaker) (DIAMETER vial)) 
(> (TEMP coffee) (TEMP ice-cube)) 
The pattern matcher works by first asserting a mBtch 
hypothesir for each potential predicate or object pairing between 
(a) and (b) with a belief of zero. For example, we could cause 
all predicates having the same name to pair up and all 
functional predicates (e.g. PRESSURE) to pair up if their parent 
predicates pair up (e.g. GREATER). The likelyhood of each 
match hypothesis is then found by running m11tch hypothesis 
evidence rules. For example, the rule 
(assert same-functor) 
(rule (( intern (MH ?11 712) 
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test (and (fact? ?1.1) (fact? 712) 
(equal-functors? ?il 7i2)))) 
(assert (1mpl1es same-functor (MH ?11 ?12) 
(0 5 0 0)))) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Match Hvnothesis Ev'dence 
(MH 
{MH 
{MH 
(MH 
(MH 
(MH 
{MH 
{MH 
(MH 
(MH 
(MH 
GREATERPr-. GREA TERT....,..at.rJ 
GREATERDiamo�or GREA TERr._.at.r,) 
PRESSUREbeobr TEMPERATUREco1r.J 
PRESSURE..;&! TEMPERATURE;� 
D IAMETERbeobr TEMPERATUREcow.J 
DIAMETER-.ia! TEMPERATURE;� 
FLOW.,..tcr FLOWhaaJ 
beaker coffee) 
vial ice-cube) 
wa�er heat) 
pipe bar) 
Figure 3. BMS S�ate After Running 
Match Hypothesis Evidence Rules 
0.650 
0.650 
0.712 
0.712 
0.712 
0.712 
0.790 
0.932 
0.932 
0.632 
0.632 
states "If �he two items are facts and their functors are the 
same, then supply 0. 5 evidence in favor of the match 
hypothesis." After running these rules, the BMS would have the 
beliefs shown in Figure 3. 
The pattern matcher then constructs all consistent sets 
of matches to form globed mtltcher such that no item in a global 
match is paired up with more than one other item. (1) and {2) 
are examples of such global matches. Once the global matches 
are formed, the pattern matcher must select the "best" match. 
To do this, a frame of discernment consisting of the, set of 
global matches is created and global match evidence rules are 
used to provide support for a global match based on various 
syntactic aspects such as overall size or •makh quality". For 
example, we could have match hypotheses provide support in 
favor of the global matches they are members of. Thus, the 
pattern matcher would choose global match (1) because the 
match hypotheses provide the most support for this 
interpretation. This is a sparse description of the matching 
algorithm discussed in (Falkenhainer et al, 1986). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The design of a belief maintenance ryrtem has been 
presented and some of its possible uses described. This system 
differs from other probabilistic reasoning systems in that it 
allows dynamic modification of the structure of the knowledge 
base and maintains a current belief for every known fact. 
Previous systems have used static networks (Pearl, 1983; 
Buchanan et al, 1984) which cannot be dynamically modified or 
simple forward chaining techniques which don't provide a 
complete set of reason-maintenance facilities (Buchanan et al, 
1984; Ginsberg, 1984, 1985). 
There are still a number of unsolved problems. First, 
the interpretation and efficient implementation of circular 
support structures needs to be examined further. Second, 
operations such as generating explicit transitivity relations 
cause new problems for belief based reasoning systems. What is 
important to note is that the basic design is independent of the 
belief system used. For any given logic of beliefs (probabilities) 
which is invertible, the assertion parser can be modified to 
construct the appropriate network. 
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